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Abstract: 
 
This paper examines the prospects of, and politics and practices around, solar energy in 
China. It examines two different solar energy technologies, namely solar photovoltaic (PV) and 
solar water heaters (SWH), in order to understand how different pathways for low  carbon 
innovation are supported and constrained by (the lack of) political support at the national and 
local level, the interactions between state and non-state actors, as well as how they relate to 
changing practices among consumers. The paper also discusses obstacles and trade-offs. 
We find two very different approaches to solar energy. The solar PV industry in China is 
experiencing increased domestic growth, after many years of being mainly export-oriented. 
Prices declined rapidly in recent years, and solar PV also enjoys much political and financial 
support from the central government and local governments. However there are high 
bureaucratic and technical hurdles to get grid connected and access the feed- in-tariff, 
particularly for individual users. Solar water heaters on the other side are a ‘home grown’ 
Chinese technology that is ubiquitous in China, particularly in rural areas, easy to install and 
use, and that has developed from the grass-roots levels to mass products with relatively little 
government support. Although being largely neglected by high-level discussions and plans, 
SWH could contribute much to low carbon transitions that are driven at the local level in China. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
China is often considered a leader in the green economy. No other country invests more in 
renewable energy than China, including in solar energy. Solar energy is important as an 
alternative source of energy as about 80% of the global primary energy supply comes from 
fossil fuels, primarily oil and coal (IEA, 2017). 
 
Energy use, energy production and CO2 emissions have increased rapidly in China since the 
beginning of its economic reforms around three decades ago. Furthermore, while China had 
low per capita energy use and emissions for a long time the country has been catching up in 
recent years. China’s per capita CO2 emissions are today comparable with those of the 
European Union (World Bank, 2017; IEA, 2017). China is also the world’s largest energy  user 
and absolute CO2 emitter (IEA, 2017) and it may lead on cumulative emissions within  10 to 
20 years (Stavins, 2014). 
 
At the same time, China has also become a world leader in renewable energy, most notably 
in wind energy, solar energy -both solar photovoltaic (PV) and solar water heaters (SWH)- and  
hydropower.  China tops the renewable  energy field globally in  terms  of   investments, 
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production and installed capacity (IEA, 2017). China invested nearly US$ 90 billion in 
renewable energy in 2012 (Bloomberg, 2013) and this is estimated to increase to more than 
US$360 billion per year by 2020 (Reuters, 2017). 
 
This paper examines the prospects of, and the politics and practices around, the green 
economy1 in China, drawing on a case study from solar energy innovation. It examines two 
different solar energy technologies, namely solar PV and SWH. The paper investigates two 
case studies in order to understand how different pathways for low carbon innovation are 
supported and constrained by (the lack of) political support at the national and local level, the 
interactions between state and non-state actors, as well as how they relate to changing 
practices among consumers. This paper also discusses how these two technologies could 
contribute to national climate and energy targets, what obstacles and trade-offs are occurring 
and how they are dealt with. This is in line with the special issue which addresses transitions 
to the green economy in the Global South. 
 
The paper finds two very different approaches to solar energy. The solar PV industry in  China 
is experiencing increased domestic growth, after many years of being mainly export- oriented. 
Prices declined rapidly in recent years, and solar PV also enjoys much political and financial 
support from the central government and local governments. However there are high 
bureaucratic and technical hurdles to get grid connected and access the feed-in-tariff, 
particularly for individual users. Solar water heaters on the other side are a ‘home grown’ 
Chinese technology that is ubiquitous in China, particularly in rural areas, easy to install and 
use, and that has developed from the grass-roots levels to mass products with relatively little 
government support. Although being largely neglected by high-level discussions and plans, 
SWH could contribute much to low carbon transitions that are driven at the local level in China. 
 
Section 2 presents the conceptual framework and methods, section 3 presents the findings, 
section 4 discussion and conclusion. 
 
 
2. Conceptualising the green economy in China 
 
2.1 The Chinese state and energy politics 
Role of the state 
Lederer, Wallbott, & Bauer (forthcoming) suggest that research on the role of the state on 
environmental issues in the Global South is rare. Exceptions are the analysis of the 
effectiveness of environmental authoritarianism as a way to reach environmental targets 
(Wurster, 2013; Beeson, 2010; Gilley, 2012; Schreurs, 2011; Held, Roger & Nag, 2013). 
 
This paper addresses China’s changing policy-making setting in relation to solar energy, 
elaborating whether and how the state plays a pro-active role in the solar energy industry 
 
1 Green economy (GE) is here defined as an economy “that results ‘in improved human well-being  and 
social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities. In its simplest 
expression, a GE is low carbon, resource efficient, and socially inclusive” (UNEP, 2011, p. 16). 
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and at what level (e.g. central, provincial, municipal government). Policy-making has changed 
considerably since the last change in leadership in China, for example with the introduction of 
the 13th Five Year Plan for the period 2016-2020 and the introduction of the “new normal” of 
lower economic growth followed by economic restructuring and  redistribution of wealth. 
 
The paper also explores whether and to which extent the state takes a pro-active role in the 
solar energy industry in China. This research is interested in the scale and scope of the pro- 
active state in the solar energy industry, for example by examining how the state is directly 
involved through state-owned enterprises (SOEs), as well as strong policy and financial 
support for its industries. China’s state can therefore be described as a pro-active state, as 
opposed to an inactive state or a laggard (see also Lederer, Wallbott, & Bauer  (forthcoming)). 
 
However, China’s ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ (Lema & Ruby, 2007) and the power struggles 
between the central and provincial / municipal governments characterises the way the state 
deals with energy issues. Different ministries within central government have different roles, 
motives, interests and approaches towards solar energy, such as the Ministry of Environment 
(MEP) which has environmental protection as its main goal, the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MOST) which is interested in innovation and scientific  development – including 
in the fossil fuel field, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) which is interested in international 
trading and cooperation. See also figure 2. There is further a discrepancy between the 
interests of the local (provincial / municipal) government and the central government. The local 
governments are subjected to legislation and executive orders from the central government, 
however the local governments have the power to implement these using their own 
interpretation. This may mean that the local government may be more lenient or stringent than 
advised by central government; or they may adopt more of a tick- box exercise by using 
creative accounting rather than implementing large-scale change. There is a saying in China 
that the further the local government is away from Beijing, the  less stringent the 
implementation of legislation and orders may be. Evidence of fragmented authoritarianism for 
low carbon energy technology development in China has been discussed by Lewis (2013), 
Wang & Liu (2017) and Gilley (2017) and this literature suggests that there is a stronger need 
to integrate politics, policy and administration. 
 
Innovation in low carbon energy technology 
 
In recent years a large body of literature on innovation in low carbon technology and its links 
to international development has emerged (e.g. Ockwell & Mallett, 2012; Watson, Byrne, 
Ockwell & Stua, 2014). China is often regarded as being in an exceptional position to become 
a global leader of the low carbon transition: China’s government is actively pursuing low 
carbon development strategies, including building up the innovative capacity of key firms; it 
has made large sums of state capital available for low carbon industries and pursues various 
strategies of accessing the latest low carbon technologies. 
 
Low carbon innovation – creating and bringing to market new products, services or ideas  that 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions – is crucial to achieving low carbon energy  transitions and 
thus mitigating climate change. The diffusion of low carbon innovation is a complex process, 
which includes research, development, demonstration and deployment (Watson, 2008), and 
is not only a technological process. It also depends on the existence  of 
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appropriate policy support and incentives for firms and other organisations to engage in 
technological development, for the creation of markets for technologies that are successfully 
commercialised as well as skilled labour, including highly trained engineers and technicians, 
and therefore involves a wide range of actors including firms, public bodies, and research 
organisations (Ockwell & Mallet, 2012; Saviotti, 2005). 
 
Historically, low and middle-income countries, including China, have depended to a large 
extent on international technology transfer and cooperation from high-income countries for 
some low carbon technologies, but over the decades, Chinese firms have built up their own 
productive capabilities as well as their own innovative capabilities (Urban, 2018). ‘Indigenous 
innovation’, according to its typical Western definition, means that a particular country’s firms 
or institutions have invented, conceptualised or built a particular innovation. From a Chinese 
perspective, indigenous innovation can also be based on foreign knowledge, experience, staff, 
networks and technology acquired from and/or licenced by Chinese firms or through reverse 
engineering based on foreign technology. These differences in understanding have caused 
frictions around intellectual property rights (IPRs) in the past. 
 
In recent years, various forms of technology cooperation such as networking, staff exchange 
schemes, joint ventures, licencing, mergers and acquisitions have played a larger role and 
indigenous innovation has become more prevalent (Urban, 2018). This is particularly relevant 
for SWH, since China uses a technology that is different to those in many other countries, and 
Chinese firms hold most of the SWH patents worldwide. There is also process innovation in 
the Chinese PV sector (Zhang & Sims Gallagher, 2016), although in the past  an exchange of 
knowledge, experience, staff and networks in a globalised market played a role for the 
development of the Chinese market. 
 
 
 
2.2 Methodology 
 
This paper is based on a study of solar energy in China, with specific focus on the different 
pathways for solar PV and SWH. It follows a case study methodology based on Yin (2003). 
Following Miles & Huberman (1994), our case selection criteria consider the significance of 
the case, its representativeness, its theoretical relevance, and data accessibility. Solar PV and 
SWH are significant, because they are the most market-ready and commercialised solar 
technologies in China. They are representative as they are used everywhere in China. This 
case is theoretically relevant as we examine the prospects, politics and practices of these 
technologies, hence socio-political issues that tend to be less discussed in low carbon 
innovation studies for China. Finally, data is accessible as the study draws on a large  number 
of materials used, including data from the Chinese Statistical Yearbooks, the IEA,  the World 
Bank, a wide range of policy documents and academic literature published in journals, books 
and working papers. 
 
The empirical research conducted for this paper includes in-depths interviews and focus group 
discussions, as well as site visits. 27 semi-structured, in-depth interviews were conducted in 
China with (solar) energy experts from research and academia, representatives from solar 
energy firms and business associations, representatives from government authorities at 
various levels and representatives from Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), as well as 
6 focus group discussions (FGDs) with groups of users of solar energy 
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and with solar energy firms in Beijing, Dezhou and Yingkou. In addition, several site visits were 
conducted to leading solar energy firms which showed us their solar production lines, their 
trade exhibitions as well as ground-mounted solar PV farms. The fieldwork was conducted 
between 2014 and 2016 in Beijing, Dezhou, Tianjin, Baoding and Shanghai. The selected 
firms include China’s leading solar firms, business associations, government authorities, 
experts and academics and representatives. Interviewees were senior  managers, experts or 
project leaders with substantial knowledge in solar energy issues in China. See table 1 for 
more details. 
Table 1: overview of the interviewees and their affiliations 
 
Sector and number of 
interviews 
Affiliation of interviewees 
Solar PV: 27 interviews, 
6 FGD with users 
Firms like Yingli Solar, Trina Solar, JA Solar, Jinko Solar, Hanergy, 
Himin (known as Huanming in China), several smaller solar energy 
firms 
 Business associations like China National Renewable Energy Centre, 
Beijing Energy Association 
 Government agencies like National Development Reform Commission 
(NDRC), provincial Development Reform Commissions (DRC), Ministry 
for Science and Technology (MOST), Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM) 
 Research institutes like Tsinghua University in Beijing, Tianjin University 
of Technology, Zhejiang University, Peking University, Hunan University, 
Shanghai University, Fudan University, NDRC’s Energy Research 
Institute (ERI), Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) 
 NGOs like Greenpeace, the Natural Resources Defence Council 
NRDC, Greenovation Hub 
 
 
3. Findings: solar energy in China 
 
China is now not only the world’s largest investor and producer of solar PV modules and SWH 
systems, but China also has the world’s largest installed capacity of SWH (REN21, 2017). 
Solar PV and SWH have different technological, economic and social characteristics and 
dynamics: solar PV is usually more expensive, higher tech and, unlike SWH, needs integration 
with the electricity grid; PV also needs to overcome higher  barriers related to IPRs on key 
upstream technologies (see Table 2 for a rough summary of these different dynamics, 
technologies and innovation pathways). 
Table 2: Key differences in solar PV and SWH 
 
Solar PV Solar water heaters 
Higher tech due to systems integration with grid Lower tech due to stand-alone system 
Partly dependent on tech / knowledge transfer Indigenous innovation 
High IP barriers Lower IP barriers 
Higher cost Lower cost 
More centralised due to integration with grid Decentralised 
Export-oriented, although strong increase in 
domestic demand in recent years 
Domestically-oriented 
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Figure 2 provides an overview of the actors involved in the policy-industry-society  interactions 
in the solar energy sector, including their relationships and flows of influence. Key players are 
the National Development and Reform Commission NDRC, the Ministry of Science and 
Technology MOST, the Ministry of Environmental Protection MEP, the Ministry  of Finance 
MOF, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology MIIT, the Ministry of Commerce 
MOFCOM, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs MOFA. 
 
Figure 2: Actor mapping for the policy-industry-society interactions in the solar energy 
sector and their relationships and inﬂuence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data source: Interviews with government, industry, research institutions, NGOs and solar energy users, 
2014-2016. Amended from Urban, Nordensvärd and Zhou, 2012. 
 
The following sections will address the status and prospects of solar PV, as well as the politics 
and the user practices. 
 
3.1 Solar PV: status and prospects 
 
By 2015, seven of the top 10 solar PV manufacturers were Chinese: Trina Solar, Yingli Green 
Energy, Canadian Solar (Chinese-owned), Hanwha SolarOne, Jingko Solar, JA Solar and 
Rene Solar (Renewables, 2015). In recent years, China accounted for about 50-70%  of 
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global PV module production (REN21 2015: 48; NDRC, 2012). China has become the world’s 
leading supplier of solar PV as in 2012 around 95% of China’s solar PV systems were 
manufactured for export (REN21, 2013). Today about 80% of all Chinese solar PV technology 
is being exported to developing countries, particularly to ASEAN countries. This is a direct 
result of the anti-dumping and anti-subsidy trade disputes between China and the EU / USA 
(Renewable Energy World, 2015). Domestically, China accounted for just under 20% of global 
installed PV capacity in late 2017 (WEC, 2017). See figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Share of cumulative installed solar PV capacity in 2016. Data from World Energy 
Council WEC, 2017. 
 
 
The domestic installed capacity is increasing as prices have fallen rapidly in recent years. In 
2008, the price of crystalline-silicon PV modules was about US$3.50-$4.00 per watt, by late 
2011 prices were below the $1.00 per watt mark for the first time, by 2013 they were about 
$0.50 per watt and have since declined further. This is mainly due to a breakthrough in  China 
in mastering purified silicon production technology. Interviewees report that “There is a rapid 
decline in solar PV prices, making it more competitive with fossil fuels, especially natural gas” 
(Representative of solar energy firm, interview, Beijing, January 2016). 
 
In its early development, the Chinese government’s renewable energy policies focused on the 
domestic installation of wind energy, while solar PV was for many years regarded as an export 
industry. For buyers, relatively high prices, a lack of government incentives and the difficulty 
of installing solar PV modules meant solar PV modules were not widely installed, especially 
for individual users. “Many potential consumers do not own or have access to roof space, and 
connectivity with the grid is technically and bureaucratically challenging” (Energy expert, 
interview, Beijing, January 2016). Most PV is used in ground-mounted, large-scale 
installations, for which financial incentives are particularly crucial. Yet, this is beginning to 
change. 
 
China has a target of 100 GW of solar PV capacity to be installed by 2020; a target that was 
increased several times as prior targets were exceeded, as energy experts report throughout 
the fieldwork. However, the installed capacity for solar PV was just over 43GW in late 2015.  It 
reached 78 GW in late 2016, which is very close to the target. With costs falling and 
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China’s solar PV industry thriving many interviewees see in China the prospect of an important 
step forward in the large-scale diffusion of low carbon energy technologies worldwide. 
 
3.2 Solar PV: politics 
 
The most important state actors are the central government, the provincial government and 
the municipal governments. The state bureaucracy also plays a major role, such as NDRC 
and various ministries like MOST, MOFCOM, MIIT, MFA etc. The most relevant non-state 
actors are solar PV firms, both privately owned and SOEs, as well as the individual and 
industry-scale users of these technologies that contribute to its domestic use. Other non- state 
actors that play a key role are banks and civil society organisations. 
 
The interviewees report that the main obstacles for the further expansion of the solar PV 
industry are the high up-front costs of solar PV; integration with the grid, including accessing 
the feed-in-tariff, which is more of a regulatory / legal challenge than a technical challenge; 
and that the public and industry regard PV as mainly being for buildings and factories, less for 
individual use by home-owners. 
 
A representative from MOFCOM mentioned that: “The approach of the grid fits with the 
Chinese history of management which is very centrally planned. The industry has been driven 
not by the grid but by people focused on subsidies. The grids think of themselves as a ministry 
not a company. If they were divided into companies, it would sometimes be more efficient. 
There is therefore a need to reform the grid.” (MOFCOM representative, interview, Beijing, 
October 2015). 
 
The government regards solar as a strategic industry; hence the central government gives 
institutional and financial support, as do local governments. The Chinese government has 
supported research on solar PV, mainly for uses in space, since the 1950s. In the 1990s and 
early 2000s, the government promoted a number of PV industry development strategies, 
mainly focused on the production of solar consumer goods for export and remote rural 
electrification (Fischer 2012: 136). From 2004 to 2008, China’s solar PV policy shifted to an 
“export-oriented growth stage” (Zhang, Andrews-Speed & Ji, 2014: 906). As the government 
supported this burgeoning export industry, it invested in technology R&D, covering almost 
every link in the solar PV manufacturing chain. Today, companies like Yingli Solar and Trina 
Solar have set up national PV key laboratories “with annual R&D investment of 592 million 
RMB and 610 million RMB respectively between 2009 and 2012.” (Sun, Zhi, Wang, Yao & Su, 
2014: 226). 
 
It is clear that boosting solar PV manufacturing became part of core central government 
strategy and important for meeting its national climate and energy targets. China had a 12th 
Five-Year Plan for Solar Power Generation (2011 to 2015). This set targets to reduce the price 
of solar power and to increase the production of PV modules (Du 2012). China has  also 
launched further incentive policies to boost PV market expansion, particularly to expand the 
PV output through feed-in-tariffs. Further, MOST has driven forward PV R&D, with an average 
annual investment of around 500 million yuan (around US$81 million) toward all segments of 
the manufacturing chain: Poly-Silicon, wafer, solar cells, PV modules, thin-film technology, 
energy storage, balance of system (BOS) components and system engineering as well as 
Concentrated Solar Power (Wang, Shu & Lv 2013: 47-50). 
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In the case of solar PV, other important actors are China’s local governments, who often give 
greater preferential treatment to solar PV firms compared to other industries. This preferential 
treatment, according to Chen (2014: 11-12), includes: “free or low-cost loans, tax rebates, 
research grants, cheap land”, as well as “energy subsidies and technological, infrastructure 
and personnel support.” Furthermore, local governments typically supported indigenous PV 
producers by instructing local commercial banks to offer “bountiful loans” at low interest rates. 
One example is Jiangsu Province, home to Chinese SOE Suntech and to some “particularly 
aggressive solar development policies” (Zhang, Andrews-Speed and Ji, 2014: 907). Suntech 
received bank loans worth US$56 million at the end of 2005, but this amount had risen to 
US$3.7 billion at the end of 2012, mainly due to municipal government’s ability to order local 
state-owned banks to provide low-interest loans (Chen 2014: 11). Interviewees report the 
unequal distribution of different levels of tax breaks and other incentives on various levels of 
government, depending on different provincial and municipal governments and sometimes 
even depending on specific officials. “Different level of taxes, land concessions and 
infrastructure access, such as the accessibility to the port in Tianjin, enable individual 
provinces or municipalities to attract solar energy firms. Each provincial or municipal 
government has their own approach, it depends strongly on local government support.” 
(Representative of Yingli Solar, interview, Tianjin, October 2015). 
 
The relationships between non-state actors, most importantly solar PV firms and banks, with 
government authorities is very close in China. The financial crisis decreased solar PV exports, 
yet central government was keen to maintain high economic growth in the sector. In 2009, the 
Golden Sun programme for distributed solar PV was launched by MOST and the National 
Energy Administration (NEA). This massive government-supported investment boom between 
2009 and 2011 resulted in even greater overcapacity of solar panel manufacturing by 2012. 
By this time Chinese production capacity of solar panels had reached 55 GW, representing 
around 150% of annual global consumption (Zhang et al, 2014: 909-10). 
 
The consequent global decline in prices of solar PV modules caused a number of US and  EU 
solar PV manufacturers to go bankrupt: between 2011 and 2012, Solyndra (USA), Q- Cells 
(Germany), BP Solar and others pulled out of the solar PV industry and others downscaled 
their operations, including Sharp (Japan) and First Solar (USA). In 2013 China’s biggest solar 
panel manufacturing firm Suntech Power announced that it had defaulted on its debt, failing 
to pay US$541 million worth of bonds. The interviewees report that Suntech,  and its founder 
Shi Zhengrong had been frequently heralded as the vanguard of China’s solar PV industry 
with considerable political support, particularly from the provincial government in Jiangsu. 
Interviewees suggested that there were several reasons for the decline of Suntech: pressure 
from local government to expand; Shi’s own management  style, external economic forces. 
Some interviewees suggest that the most immediate cause may have been Suntech’s long-
term contracts for the supply of polysilicon, which became a drain on the firm after its price fell 
dramatically in 2011, thanks to breakthroughs in the production process. Yet, the fact that 
Suntech survived, albeit in a smaller form, shows how the pro-active state actively raises the 
level of government support behind the solar PV industry. 
 
 
3.3 Solar PV: practices, obstacles and trade-offs 
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Despite rapid decreases in price, solar PV installations are still relatively expensive for private 
users, such as individual households. The following section of the paper assesses  the 
practices, obstacles and trade-offs of solar PV in China and how they are being dealt with. 
Solar energy is considered as climate-friendly, environment-friendly and does not lead to 
adverse effects of the same scale or severity as other energy sources (e.g. displacement and 
resettlement of millions of people for large dams; nuclear waste, risk of nuclear accidents, 
nuclear health and safety; poor working conditions for coal miners and large contribution to 
climate change by fossil fuels). Hence, the trade-offs between the environmental, social and 
economic dimensions are rather limited. 
 
Interviewees suggest that a major obstacle to the increased use of solar PV is the predominant 
use of fossil fuels, and particularly coal, and the importance they continue to play in China’s 
energy mix. The heavy reliance on fossil fuels diminishes efforts towards a low carbon 
transition. Still, the IEA (2017) electricity figures for China show a moderate increase in 
renewables in recent years (more than 20% renewable energy in 2015), hence meeting official 
targets. 
 
Other obstacles for the further diffusion of this technology include the limitations of roof-top 
space for solar PV, competition for land for various uses (including agricultural) vs land for 
ground-mounted PV installations. Our fieldwork shows that in urban areas, a common problem 
is the lack of privately-owned roof-space and the fact that much of the roof-space is shared, 
hence requiring the approval of a large number of neighbours in apartment blocks or high-rise 
buildings. The financial risks of privately-installed PV installations are therefore individualised, 
while the approval and decision-making process of allowing PV on roof-tops  is collectivised. 
Even in mega-cities such as Shanghai, our fieldwork reveals that  there seems to be little 
knowledge about low carbon energy, let al.one solar PV systems, among the public. Our 
fieldwork found that when the low carbon lifestyle advocate Ni Huan, the first person to install 
thin-film solar PV panels in Shanghai, aimed to install the systems at her home, she was 
confronted with social challenges such as her neighbour’s safety concerns with regards to PV 
systems catching fire. It took her only two weeks to install thin-film solar PV modules in July 
2014, yet before she could manage that she had to talk to her neighbours for 2-3 months and 
get the approval of the local committee as the apartment block’s roof-top space is jointly 
owned. She concluded, that the biggest obstacle to private solar PV installation is the cost of 
legal challenges, while the cost of solar PV is falling (Ni Huan, interview, Shanghai, November 
2015). 
 
Yet, costs seem to be one of the main prohibiting factors for individual users: according to  our 
fieldwork, thin-film PV systems, such as copper indium gallium selenide (CIGS) thin-film, cost 
about 24,000 RMB (US$ 3,700) for 2 kW, while prices for silicon-based PV systems have 
declined to below US$ 0.5 per kW, hence 2 kW costing less than US$ 1,000 in China. Outside 
China, PV prices are far more expensive. Interviewees complained that it takes a long time to 
pay back the investment: “Feed-in-tariffs are low, as is the electricity price, hence the payback 
period is 8-10 years.” (Representative of solar energy firm, interview, Dezhou, December 
2014). “The feed-in-tariff differs from province to province, but a typical feed-in-tariff for solar 
PV is 0.2-0.3 Yuan/kWh plus 0.42 Yuan/kWh for the electricity price, so a total of 0.7-0.8 
Yuan/kWh.” … “There is no easy financial route for individual users in the residential market 
to increase ownership of PV, as banks are not usually keen to provide loans or similar services 
for renewable energy. Bureaucratic and technical hurdles make grid 
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connections to PV systems difficult and complex.” (Energy expert, interview, Tianjin, October 
2015). 
 
For large-scale installations, solar companies reported that the main obstacle is the grid. It is 
very bureaucratic and lengthy to connect PV installations to the grid. Interviewees stress that 
this is not a technical issue, but a legal / regulatory and administrative issue. The grid 
companies have to send out their engineers, check that the PV installation is in accordance 
with the regulations and technical standards used in the grid area and they are sometimes 
reluctant to invest this additional time and effort. 
 
At the same time, competition for land and various uses of land for ground-mounted PV 
installations may be a trade-off. This relates particularly to agricultural use of land. Our 
fieldwork found that in the rural areas of the municipality of Beijing, the Beijing Energy 
Association is piloting a programme which allows small-holder farmers to receive solar PV 
installations free of charge. After successful connection with the grid the farmers benefit from 
the feed-in-tariff. However, there is a major concern about the use of this agricultural land as 
the farmers would lose a part of their land to PV installations or attempt to “farm beneath the 
solar PV installations”, which was mentioned as a suggestion in our fieldwork (Interview with 
NGO representative, Beijing, December 2014), but this is highly unlikely to work in practice 
due to a lack of understanding of agricultural practices by the project funders. 
 
Another trade-off for solar PV is that environmental pollution and occupational health risks 
arise due to toxic chemicals being used in the production process of solar panels. Interviewees 
mention ‘hidden environmental effects’ of purportedly clean technologies, such as for silicon 
processing and purification for solar PV. The substances that are used are similar to those 
used in micro-electronics industries. However these are marginal effects compared to the 
large-scale and often much more serious environmental and health risks that other energy 
options entail. 
 
 
3.4 SWH: status and prospects 
 
The section above discussed solar PV, this section elaborates on SWH. SWH are a ‘home 
grown’ Chinese technology that is ubiquitous in China, particularly in rural areas, and that has 
developed from grass-roots levels to mass products with relatively little government support. 
 
Annini, Duric, Gonzalez & Perissinotto (2014:1) describe SWH as the “undiscussed 
protagonist” of a transition from fossil fuels to low carbon energy. China is the largest solar hot 
water market worldwide. SWH were first developed in the 1970s in China. In the 1980s China 
began to produce flat plate SWH that were based on technology transfer of a Canadian design 
(similar to the predominant design used in Europe today). However, the production was 
expensive and there were technical problems. In the 1990s, Chinese scientists at the Beijing 
Solar Energy Research Institute at Tsinghua University developed and patented the 
evacuated tube design (also called the vacuum tube): an example of indigenous, low-cost 
innovation. This follows a trend that we can also see in the wind energy sector, namely the 
emphasis on university-led R&D for renewables at national level in China. Non-state actors 
such as SWH firms and universities and research institutions are therefore particularly  
important  for  this  sector.  R&D  in  the  evacuated  tube  design  was     heavily 
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supported by the national government until it was commercialised in 1998. Himin Solar Energy 
Group, China’s leader in SWH, was the key player for commercialising the product and scaling 
up the business. Today, leading firms, such as Himin, still cooperate with the Chinese 
Academy of Sciences (CAS) and universities for R&D in SWH. This requires a skilled work 
force for developing cutting-edge innovation, in addition to a low-cost work force for production 
of SWH (Annini et al., 2014). Today 95% of all the SWH in China are of the evacuated tube 
design, according to Hu, Pejun & Wang (2012). It is estimated that Chinese firms hold 95% of 
the patents for core technologies of SWH worldwide (CGTI, 2009). This is being confirmed by 
the interviewees. 
 
Figure 3: Share of the total installed capacity of solar water heating in operation by  economic 
region in 2016. 
 
Data from Weiss et al., 2017. 
 
Today, Chinese SWH are predominantly produced for the domestic market, particularly in rural 
areas and small towns. Almost 65% of the world’s installed solar water heater capacity was in 
China in 2009 (REN21, 2012). By 2016 this figure had reached over 80%, meaning a total of 
442 million square meters of SWH had been installed in China, according to Weiss, Spork-
Dur and Mauthner (2017:53). See figure 3. In 2009 it was reported that over 30 million 
households used SWH households (CGTI, 2009), while calculations suggest that today over 
75 million solar water heating systems are being used in China. It is estimated that more  than 
309.5 MW of solar thermal heating capacity is currently installed in China, which is reported to 
save about 86,000,000 t CO2 per annum. (Weiss et al, 2017:53). Interviewees point out that 
the “carbon savings of solar water heaters are more than the value of the  entire current carbon 
trading system of China” (Representative of solar energy firm, interview, Dezhou, December 
2014). 
The interviewees are unanimous in suggesting that the potential market for SWH in China is 
huge. Today, about one million SWH are being manufactured every year (Hu et al., 2012), 
though regional variations exist, with Shandong having the highest penetration rate of SWH, 
namely, about 20% of all households owning water heaters (Li, Song, Beresford & Ma,  2011). 
Shandong province is also home to a solar water heater innovation cluster, which hosts the 
world’s largest solar water heater firms. Interviewees suggest that this cluster   has 
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developed partly due to provincial and municipal government support, networks among 
innovative firms, good infrastructure links and the lack of cheap provincial fossil fuel resources. 
 
The sector has seen a rapid increase over the last 15 years (Liu, Wang, Zhang & Xue,  2010). 
It is estimated that growth rates for solar water heater annual output increased at about 20-
25% each year between 2000 and 2010 (Hu et al., 2012). Figure 4 shows the accumulated 
installation of SWH and their growth rate. Interviewees point out that they see a further 
increase in the Chinese SWH market in the near to medium-term future. 
Figure 4: Accumulated installation of SWH between 2005 and 2015, measured in MW. 
 
 
Calculated based on data from Weiss, Spork-Dur and Mauthner, 2017. 
 
Our fieldwork found that experts estimate that there are about 3,000 solar water heater firms 
in China, of which about 1,800 are solar water heater manufacturers and the remaining 1,200 
firms are component suppliers. Of these 3,000 firms, the top 10 firms account for more than a 
quarter of the Chinese solar water heater industry and about 30 firms are relatively large firms 
in terms of sales volume and production. Four firms are reported to have an annual sales 
volume of approximately 2 billion yuan (around US$326 million), two firms have an annual 
sales volume of approximately 0.5-1 billion yuan ($81-$162 million) and more than 
20 firms have an annual sales volume of approximately 100-500 million yuan ($16-$81 million) 
(Hu et al. 2012). Both private firms and SOEs form the solar water heater industry. 
 
There are several innovation clusters in the solar water heater industry, for example in 
Shandong, Jiangsu and Beijing (Hu et al., 2012). China has introduced several national 
standards to guarantee the quality of SWH and has put the Chinese Committee for the 
Standardization of Solar Energy in charge of this process. Three product-testing centres  exist 
in Beijing, Hubei and Yunnan, although some leading firms have their own testing centres. The 
State Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine oversees the testing 
and it is estimated that about 80-93% of the tested SWH pass the standards test. There are 
also voluntary certification centres that certify the quality of the SWH and/or their impact on 
the environment (e.g. ISO 14001-type certifications). There is however a continuous problem 
with some small and medium enterprises (SMEs), particularly 
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in rural areas, that have sub-standard production systems and outputs (Hu et al., 2012; Han 
et al., 2010). Interviewees highlight the importance of high-quality SWH and stress that “cheap 
copy-cat SWH can cause serious damage such as water damage to homes,  breaking of 
frames and tubes.” (Representative of Himin Solar, interview, Dezhou, December 2014). 
 
Today, the solar water heater supply chain is complex, including manufacturing firms, 
component suppliers, service providers, distributors, utility firms and sales agents.  The sector 
has increasingly become more efficient, thereby also decreasing costs per unit. According to 
interviewees, “a solar hot water heater costs a few thousand RMB, depending on quality and 
size.” (Representative of solar energy firm, interview, Dezhou, December 2014). 
 
In terms of costs, the SWH have higher upfront costs than electric hot water boilers or natural 
gas hot water heaters; however, they have minimal annual maintenance costs and lower 
annual costs than the other hot water heaters when compared by lifecycle analysis  (Hu et al., 
2012). The economic break-even point for SWH compared to electric water heaters is usually 
at around 3 years; afterwards electric heaters are far more expensive than solar heaters (Li et 
al., 2011). 
 
3.5 SWH: politics 
 
SWH make an interesting case as they have relatively little stable national financing incentives 
since the evacuated tube design was commercialised in 1998 (although there was national-
level support for R&D before its commercialisation). There are few formal subsidies at the 
national level and there is a limited amount of industrial policy that supports the growth of the 
solar water heater industry. Unlike solar PV and wind energy, SWH have been developed 
mainly at the local level after their commercialisation without much central government 
support. However, between 1970s and the 1990s, central government initiatives played a key 
role for developing the cutting-edge evacuated tube design. These were mainly supply-side 
policies and subsidies provided by the state. Today, in the absence of much central 
government support, solar thermal firms are arguing for more government subsidies: “To be 
more profitable we need more subsidies from the government.” (Representative of solar 
thermal firm, interview, Dezhou, December 2014). 
 
Nevertheless, since the introduction of the Renewable Energy Law in 2006, there has been  a 
rapid expansion of solar water heater installation across China. This is mainly due to two policy 
incentives: 
 
First, since 2007 some provincial and municipal governments – including Hainan, Fujian, 
Jiangsu, Hebei, Henan, Shandong and Ningxia and cities like Shenzhen, Jinan, Rizhao, 
Yantai, Zibo, Qingdao, Xingtai, Qinhuangdao, Zhengzhou, Sanmenxia, Hohhot, Nanjing and 
Wuhan – have introduced a mandatory requirement to install SWH as part of every new 
building. 
 
Second, another important policy is a payment of subsidies for SWH under the 2009 policy on 
“household appliances going to the countryside”, which aims to increase the availability and 
use of SWH in rural areas with a subsidy equivalent to a reduction of 13% of the wholesale 
price (Hu et al., 2012). Solar energy experts and firm representatives stressed the 
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importance of these two policies as the legislative and financial driving forces by provincial 
and municipal governments to support the SWH industry and technology uptake. 
 
In addition, local provincial and municipal governments provide financial support to SWH firms, 
such as access to cheap land and tax rebates. SWH firms, both private and SOEs, therefore 
have strong links with local governments. 
 
The fieldwork involved speaking to a focus group in Baoding, Hebei province, who were 
residents of new high-rise buildings that had SWH installed on a mandatory basis. The locals 
were very positive about the use of SWH, praised the mandatory SWH requirements of the 
new buildings and the role of the local government in achieving these requirements, and 
discussed their motivations for supporting it such as “being environmentally-friendly”, 
“supporting the local industry” and “cost-saving” etc (local users of SWH, focus group 
discussion, Baoding, October 2015). 
 
The NDRC’s Medium and Long-Term Plan for Renewable Energy in China, which was  issued 
in 2007 and covers plans up to the year 2020, mentions targets for SWH: a total heat collecting 
area of 300 million square metres to be installed by 2020, replacing 60 million tons of coal 
equivalent (tce). By 2015 a total of 442 million square meters of SWH had been installed in 
China (Weiss et al., 2017:53), thereby easily exceeding the initial targets for 2020. 
Interestingly, SWH are mentioned less than solar PV or other renewables in more recent 
national policy documents. The 12th and the 13th Five Year  Plans,  covering  the periods 2011-
2015 and 2016-2020, do not seem to focus much on SWH. This might be due to the 
assumption that Chinese SWH are already a mature technology, widely commercialised and 
deployed for two decades. 
 
Interestingly, fiscal or taxation incentives in China for the SWH industry is patchy or ad-hoc at 
best, yet solar hot water installation and sales have nevertheless increased rapidly in recent 
years, only driven by a large and rapidly expanding demand, particularly in the rural areas and 
in smaller towns. Interviewees argue that SWH meet the demand of millions of Chinese 
customers by offering good quality, high performance, but at a low cost. 
 
The above section stressed the role of the state at the municipal and provincial level, not the 
national level. The pro-active, central state has therefore withdrawn from actively supporting 
the SWH industry, instead individual provincial and municipal governments have filled this gap 
at an ad-hoc and patchy basis. This ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ (Lema and Ruby, 2007) 
causes limits to growth for the SWH sector, yet at the same time is has enabled the sector to 
grow below the radar and avoid strict national scrutiny, but enjoys strong local support. 
3.6 SWH: practices, obstacles and trade-offs 
 
The above section presented the case of the flourishing solar water heater industry and the 
factors that have made it to a domestic, large-scale success, with provincial champions while 
the central government has been predominantly involved in the early stages of the technology 
development, not in the later stages. An important factor in this is demand successes. About 
75 million solar water heater systems are estimated to be installed in  China (Weiss et al., 
2017:53), evidence that individual consumers can significantly drive forward the uptake and 
large-scale deployment of low carbon innovation. 
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In the absence of centrally-administrated financial incentives for SWH, interviewees stressed 
the importance of local employment creation. Dezhou, China’s Solar Energy Valley, is also a 
proof that creating a local low carbon innovation cluster attracts a wide range of investments 
and the mushrooming of solar energy firms, in addition to local employments and tax revenues 
for the municipality. “In Dezhou alone, 50,000 people work in solar energy. Locals are very 
supportive of this industry.” (Representative of Shandong province Development and Reform 
Commission, interview, December 2014). 
 
Interviewees suggest that SWH are also based on China’s natural endowments for solar 
energy. It reduces pressure during peak load and thereby contributes to energy security and 
opportunities for economic growth at the local and provincial level. At the grassroots level it  is 
also suggested that end-users in China have in general a very positive attitude and high levels 
of public acceptance towards low carbon energy due to the general awareness of China’s 
resource scarcity and the fact that solar energy provides employment in many regions in China 
(Li et al., 2011). Interviewees mentioned another reason for China’s rapid rise in SWH, namely 
the relaxed building codes that enable setting up SWH on roofs without planning permission 
or other bureaucratic rules (contrary to solar PV), which depends on the discretion of local 
governments. However, our fieldwork finds that experts as well as users think that the most 
important argument for SWH is their low cost. 
 
At the same time, solar water heating is culturally accepted as it has been practiced for  many 
centuries in China. “SWH fit with the traditional practices of water heating in China. Before 
modern SWH existed, people in rural China filled dark buckets with water, put them on their 
roofs and waited until the sun heated up the water, so that people could have their baths or 
showers.” (Energy researcher, interview, Beijing, January 2016). Modern SWHs are therefore 
in line with traditional, preferred practices of heating water in rural China. This is despite some 
disadvantages of SWH, such as 1. the limited volume of hot water that solar heaters can 
produce at any one time, 2. the time it takes to heat up new water once the first volume of hot 
water has been used, 3. as solar radiation varies, the time for heating up water can take longer 
on cloudy days than on sunny days. Yet, none of this was mentioned as particularly 
inconvenient by the users of SWH in the focus group discussions or interviews, particularly as 
the low cost of SWH outweighs other minor disadvantages. An Interviewee from Himin 
confirms that “about half of our SWH products are sold to residential customers, both in rural 
and urban areas, and half to the public sector, such as to schools  and hospitals.” 
(Representative of Himin Solar, interview, Dezhou, December 2014). 
The main obstacles for the development of SWH in China are limited central government 
support; the ad-hoc, patchy and fragmented approach to state support by some municipalities 
and provincial government authorities; quality issues with cheap copy-cat products from low-
quality firms; the changing user practices required for using SWH over electric or gas boilers, 
although this seems to have a minimal effect in China. As with solar PV, more severe trade-
offs between environmental, social and economic dimensions are not occurring, unlike for 
other energy sources such as fossil fuels, nuclear power plants or large hydropower dams. 
State-actors at the national level have predominantly focussed on solar PV, while SWH has 
received little central government support over the two last decades. Yet, there has been a lot 
of support from local governments for SWH, including in Hainan, Fujian, Jiangsu, Hebei, 
Henan, Shandong and Ningxia and cities. 
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4. Discussion and conclusion 
 
This paper reviewed pathways towards the green economy in China by examining a case 
study on solar energy in China. The research analysed two different solar energy technologies, 
namely solar PV and SWH. It assessed the prospects, politics and practices of China’s low 
carbon transitions in solar energy and how it is associated with different models of innovation, 
as well as addressing the role of the state, particularly central vs local government and its role 
in supporting innovation in solar energy. 
 
Trade-offs between the environmental, social and economic dimensions are relatively minor 
as discussed above, but there are a series of obstacles that limit the further growth of the solar 
energy industry in China. Obstacles for the further growth of the solar PV industry in China are 
the inhibitive costs for individual consumers; the lack of roof-top space particularly in urban 
areas; the earlier reliance on the export market with overseas demand crashing following the 
global financial crisis and the trade disputes on anti-dumping prices; the bureaucratic and 
administrative hurdles for applying the feed-in-tariff that make it difficult for private customers 
to make use of it. Main obstacles for the further growth of the SWH industry in China are the 
absence of active central government support which means that SWH tend to be neither 
accounted for in official climate targets nor supported by recent central government finances 
or policy; and the ad-hoc, patchy and fragmented approach to state support by some 
municipalities and provincial government authorities. 
The key actors that play a role are state agencies at varying levels, particularly from central 
government for solar PV (such as NDRC, MOST, MOFCOM), and at provincial  and  municipal 
level for SWH; solar firms and business associations; individual customers particularly for 
SWH, whereas industrial large-scale customers play a stronger role for solar PV; research 
institutions and universities that support the R&D of these technologies and to a limited extent 
also NGOs. 
 
The paper found two very different approaches to solar energy. The solar PV industry in China 
is experiencing increased domestic growth, after many years of being mainly export- oriented. 
Despite recent declines in prices of solar PV panels, the industry still enjoys much political and 
financial support from the central government and local governments. This underpins the 
theories of a pro-active state and its importance for driving forward low carbon transitions and 
decarbonisation of economies. 
 
SWH systems on the other side are a ‘home grown’ Chinese technology that is ubiquitous in 
China, particularly in rural areas, and that has developed from grass-roots levels to mass 
products with relatively little government support. More important than the state is the issue of 
demand success. With an estimated 75 million solar water heater systems currently installed 
in China, individual users have massively contributed to the deployment and uptake of this 
technology and the carbon savings equal more than those of the total current pilot carbon 
trading system in China. 
 
We also found very different approaches to these two solar technologies by the state. For solar 
PV, the pro-active state, in this case particularly central government authorities, have played 
and are playing an important role. This is visible in financial support, as well as policy support 
and organisational support. This does not exist as such for SWH. Some central government 
support existed up to the 1990s, as the technology matured this support was 
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however withdrawn. Instead, municipal and provincial government authorities have partly 
replaced some central government functions by providing some support, albeit rather patchy 
and ad-hoc without much continuity or replicability across municipalities/provinces. This has 
resulted in a couple of favourable policies in some provinces and municipalities and some 
financial support for SWH firms, however nothing at the scale or consistency of central 
government support. Instead, solar water heater firms depend on local demand success and 
the favour of mass consumers. 
 
Still, both the solar PV and the solar water heater technologies and industries are highly 
commercialised and market-ready in China. Hence both technologies are success stories, 
albeit with very different characteristics and dynamics. 
 
With regards to recommendations for scaling up low carbon transitions in solar energy, the 
solar PV industry and PV policy could benefit from learning how the solar water heater industry 
grew rapidly and continuously in recent years in the domestic market, how domestic demand 
was created and how this could be supported and improved in the solar PV sector. Expanding 
domestically requires achieving lower prices, or introducing higher subsidies, that could make 
solar PV more affordable for individual consumers and hence the mass market. Access to the 
feed-in-tariff would also need to be simplified. At the moment the focus of the government is 
too much on growing the scale of the domestic PV market by growing the size of ground-
mounted, industrial-scale installations. The experience from the Chinese solar water heater 
industry however indicates that there is not necessarily a need for the central government to 
drive industrial-scale installations, but that the key to success are lower prices and easy 
installation without much bureaucracy to enable individual consumers to purchase and use 
their own solar energy installations. This needs targeted subsidy programmes and reduction 
of bureaucratic and technical hurdles, particularly in the rural areas where roof-top spaces are 
more readily available. 
 
The solar water heater sector provides evidence of a less tightly governed sector that mainly 
thrives due to individual consumer choices. Representatives of solar water heating firms stress 
the importance of SWH for a Chinese low carbon transition and for achieving national climate 
change mitigation targets and thereby argue for more financial and policy support from central 
government. 
 
In conclusion, lessons can be learned from both technologies and their politics and practices 
to increase the chances for wider, successful low carbon transitions in China’s energy sector. 
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